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LOOKING BACK

L. Ralph Mecham became Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts in July 1985, in the wake of a tumultuous
and historic period in the bankruptcy court system. The United
States Supreme Court had declared the then-existing bankruptcy
system, which had been enacted by Congress in 1978, unconstitution-
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al.1 While the Supreme Court had stayed its mandate for six months
to allow Congress to revise the system, Congress did not react within
that time period, and as a result, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts was for a time in doubt.2 Morale ran low among bankruptcy
judges and divisions emerged within the judiciary about whether
Congress should give bankruptcy judges Article III status, or retain
them as adjuncts to the Article III courts.
During this period of uncertainty and upheaval, the bankruptcy
system continued to function, much to the credit of the Judicial
Conference, the Administrative Office, circuit and district courts, the
bankruptcy courts, and the bankruptcy bar. Under the leadership of
Director Mecham and others, the bankruptcy system has stabilized.
Bankruptcy judges now participate on most Judicial Conference
committees and have a voice in issues that affect them. This Article
discusses some of the challenges that faced the bankruptcy system in
the last decade, and the responses to them. It also offers some new
ideas on bankruptcy court structure for future consideration.
A. JurisdictionalBackground of Bankruptcy Courts
The Bankruptcy Act of 18983 (1898 Act) allocated authority among
bankruptcy referees (or bankruptcy judges as they were called after
the adoption of the 1973 Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure), federal
district courts, and state courts. Under the 1898 Act, federal district
courts were "courts of bankruptcy,"4 and bankruptcy referees were
given limited power to assist the district courts in the exercise of their
bankruptcy jurisdiction.'
The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 also distinguished
between summary and plenary jurisdiction. Under summary jurisdiction, the bankruptcy referee handled matters related generally to
estate administration.6 Under plenary jurisdiction, the district court

1. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
2. Northern Pipeline was decided on June 28, 1982. Id. at 50. The Supreme Court
mandated the stay of its judgment until December 24, 1982. See id. at 88 (staying mandate until
October 4, 1982); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 813, 813
(1982) (extending stay until December 24, 1982). Congress did not enact legislation to resolve
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts until July 10, 1984. Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
3. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979).
4. i&§1.

5. 1i §§ 38-39.

6. 1I § 23(b); see alsoKatchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323,328-29 (1966) (stating that provision
for summary disposition "is one of the means chosen by Congress to effectuate" prompt and
effectual administration and settlement of estate); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Bray, 225
U.S. 205, 218 (1912) (stating that "[a] distinct purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to subject the
administrations of the estates of bankrupts to the control of tribunals clothed with authority and
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often exercised its bankruptcy authority over actions by the trustee
against parties who had not consented to bankruptcy authority.7
The jurisdictional structure established by the 1898 Act potentially
limited the progress of a bankruptcy case in a number of ways. For
instance, litigation often needlessly centered on whether the court or
trustee had possession of the estate property.8 Similarly, important
litigation arising under plenary jurisdiction awaited resolution in
district or state court before the administration of the bankruptcy case
could proceed. Such delays often frustrated the efforts of trustees
and debtors-in-possession bringing claims against third parties, as well
as those of corporate debtors who were attempting to liquidate estate
property and carry on operations during the pendency of the
bankruptcy process.9
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197810 was directed at improving
aspects of the Bankruptcy Act, such as the divided jurisdictional
structure." Thus, section 1471 of the Act abolished the distinction
between summary and plenary jurisdiction. 12 Under the new
bankruptcy court system, bankruptcy judges were to be appointed by
the President for fourteen-year terms. 3 These bankruptcy judges
were to exercise jurisdiction over all cases under title 11,14 and "all
civil proceedings arising under [title 11], or arising in or related to"

charged with the duty of proceeding to final settlement and disposition in a summary way, as
are the courts of bankruptcy").
7. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 23(a), 30 Stat. 544, 552; see also 1 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 1 3.01(1) (b) (iv), at 3-9 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1995).
8. See 1 CoLLIER, supranote 7, at 3-9 to 3-10 (noting that "primary battleground between
trustees and defendants [was] often... one ofjurisdiction rather than merits").
9. See 1 CoIuE, supra note 7, at 3-10 to 3-11.
10. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.). The jurisdictional structure of the bankruptcy
courts is set forth in title 28 of the United States Code, informally denominated the "Judicial
Code."
11. 1 COLLER, supra note 7, at 3-9 (stating that 1978 statute was designed to avoid
procedural battle between "summary" and "plenary"jurisdiction).
12. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-598, § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2668. This
provision enacted a new 28 U.S.C. § 1471, subsequently repealed, which granted to the
bankruptcy courts "all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts,"
including "civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11."
Act of Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. at 2668. The House Report on an earlier version of the 1978 Act
described the jurisdictional grant by stating that "[t]jhe bankruptcy court is given in personam
jurisdiction as well as in rem jurisdiction to handle everything that arises in a bankruptcy case."
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 445 (1977), quoted in 1 COLIER, supra note 7,
13.01 [iv], at 3-9. Section 1471 was found unconstitutional in NorthernPipeine. NorthernPipeine,
458 U.S. at 87; see also infra Part I.B (discussing Northern Pipeine decision). Prior to the
abolishment of the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction, a bankruptcy court
was basically limited to in rem jurisdiction.
13. See28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. Tide 11 is commonly called the "Bankruptcy Code."
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a bankruptcy case." Thus, the Bankruptcy Reform Act shifted the
resolution of most bankruptcy litigation from the district and state
courts to the bankruptcy court.
B. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
Four years after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, a contract dispute between a chapter 11 debtor and one of its
customers presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to
review Congress' section 1471 delegation of authority to the bankruptcy courts. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. MarathonPipeLine Co. 6
involved the constitutionality of a bankruptcy court's authority to
decide a state law breach of contract claim. After Northern Pipeline
filed for bankruptcy, it brought a non-bankruptcy action against
Marathon Pipe Line in bankruptcy court under the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act.
The Supreme Court invalidated section 1471 because it delegated
too much judicial authority to non-Article III bankruptcy judges.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
rejected a functional approach to analyzing the constitutionality of
legislative courts, ruling that bankruptcy courts did not fit into any of
the existing categories of permissible Article I courts, and that their
jurisdiction violated Article III."s While Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor concurred in the judgment, they contended that it was
unconstitutional for Congress to vest in the bankruptcy court broad
authority to adjudicate questions of state law that were only tangentially related to federal bankruptcy law." The three dissenters focused
on whether the bankruptcy court undermined separation of powers,
20
concluding that it did not.
C. The Emergency Rule
The Supreme Court, perhaps realizing the effect of declaring
unconstitutional the bankruptcy system as it was then structured,
stayed its mandate until midnight, December 24, 1982.21 When it

15. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-598, ch. 90, § 1471(b), 92 Star. 2549,
2668.
16. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
17. Interestingly, Northern Pipe!/ne ended up being a successful chapter 11 proceeding-albeit under a somewhat differentjurisdictional basis than the one under which it began.
18. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,70-71,76 (1982).
19. I& at 90 (Rehnquist, O'ConnorJ.J., concurring in judgment).
20. Id. at 98-100 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, CJ., and Powell, J.).
21. See i& at 88 (staying mandate until October 4, 1982); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 813 (1982) (extending stay until December 24, 1982).

FROM ORPHAN TO MATURITY

1995]

1495

became clear that Congress would not- be able to correct the
constitutional defect before the stay expired, the Judicial Conference
of the United States moved to fill the vacuum created by the Northern
Pipeline decision. The Judicial Conference proposed an Emergency
Rule2 to be adopted as a local rule by district courts, which would
of,their dockets by jurisdichave otherwise faced critical expansion
23
cases.
bankruptcy
tionally orphaned
The Emergency Rule interpreted Northern Pipeline narrowly. It left
intact the portions of section 1471 that provided that cases and civil
proceedings falling within the section be referred to bankruptcy
judges. Also, the Emergency Rule neither precluded bankruptcy
courts from adjudicating traditional bankruptcy matters nor prevented
them from exercising limited authority with respect to related
matters.2 4 The Emergency Rule permitted the district court to
withdraw any part of a case or civil proceeding "on its own motion or
on a timely motion by a party" and, in related matters, provided for
a de novo review in the district court of a bankruptcy court's
findings.'
The Bankruptcy Amendments and FederalJudgeshipAct
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 198426
(1984 Act) essentially adopted the structure contained in the
Emergency Rule. It vested bankruptcy jurisdiction in the district
courts, but permitted the district courts to refer all bankruptcy
D.

22. See Memorandum from William E. Foley, Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, to the Judges of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, District Courts, Bankruptcy
Courts, and the Clerks of the Bankruptcy Courts (Sept. 27, 1982) (on file with author). The
Emergency Rule maintained the bankruptcy system established by the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 except "that in certain civil proceedings ... 'related' to cases commenced under the
Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcyjudges could not enter final judgments or dispositive orders." 1
COLLIER, supranote 7, at 3-15.

23. The Emergency Rule was initially proposed under authority of the Judicial Conference
and the Judicial Councils of the Circuits. The Judicial Conference requested that the
Administrative Office draft a model rule under the Conference's statutory authority "to submit
suggestions to the various courts in the interest of uniformity and expedition of business." 28
U.S.C. § 331 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The CircuitJudicial Councils, pursuant to their authority
"to make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business
of the courts within its circuit," id § 332, directed the district courts to adopt the model rule.
See White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 704 F.2d 254, 262 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that grant
ofpower to CircuitJudicial Councils enables them "to adopt emergency measures to prevent the
collapse of the bankruptcy system").
24. Emergency Rule, reprintedin I COLLuE, supra note 7, at 8-15 to 3-18.
25. Emergency Rule (c) (2), (e) (2) (B), reprinted in I COLLIER, supranote 7, at 3-16, 3-18.
26. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.).
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matters to bankruptcy judges.27 The 1984 Act established two
categories of bankruptcy proceedings: (1) "core" proceedings that
may generally be regarded as more central to the bankruptcy
adjudication than those that merely "relate to" the case,28 and (2) all
other (or "non-core") matters, which for the most part involve claims
that would survive outside of bankruptcy, and in the absence of
bankruptcy, would have been brought in a state or district court, and
claims collateral to the bankruptcy administration.29
The 1984 Act gave bankruptcy judges authority to enter final
judgments in core matters, but restricted their authority to enter final
judgments in non-core matters absent the consent of the parties."
The Act further provided for de novo review by a district judge in
non-core matters where this consent was lacking, and designated
bankruptcy judges as "a unit of the district court to be known as the
bankruptcy court for that district."3
While the 1984 Act settled the controversy regarding whether
bankruptcy judges would receive Article III status, it created yet
another brief crisis. When passing the 1984 Act, Congress neglected
to provide a mechanism to keep the bankruptcy courts functioning
until the Act became fully effective. Thus, for a time there was no
authority for bankruptcy courts to function at all.
During this period, some bankruptcy judges were designated as
"bankruptcy consultants" so that the work of the courts could
Other judges were appointed as special magiscontinue.3 2

27. See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). The 1984 Act also provided for the appointment of
bankruptcy judges by the circuits, rather than by the President. See id. § 152(a) (1).
28. Examples of core proceedings are set out in § 157(b) (2). Although not exclusive, the
list of core proceedings includes: estate administration; permissibility "of claims against the
estate or exemptions from property of the estate"; proceedings related to preferences and
fraudulent conveyances; motions related to the automatic star, dischargeability determinations;
plan confirmations; proceedings affecting the liquidation of assets; and matters concerning the
liquidation of the estate's assets. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2) (1988).
29. See ICOLLIER, supranote 7,1 3.01(1) (c) (iii), at 3-27 to 3-29. An example of a non-core

proceeding is a debtor's right to recover damages for a tort or breach of contract committed by
a third party prior to the bankruptcy.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) and (2) (1988).
31. Id. § 151.
32. See Memorandum from William E. Foley, Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, to Chief Judges, United States Courts of Appeals, ChiefJudges, United
States District Courts, Circuit Executives, and District Court Executives (June 28, 1984) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Memorandum ofJune 28, 1984] (setting forth procedures to be used
in handling bankruptcy matters); Memorandum from William E. Foley, Director of the
Administrative Office ofthe United States Courts, to all ChiefJudges, BankruptcyJudges, Circuit
Executives, District Court Executives, and Clerks of Court (Aug. 18, 1984) (on file with author)
(indicating that many individuals still were on courts' payrolls as consultants).
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trates3s
The judiciary's authority to pay bankruptcy judges was
questioned.'

The survival of the bankruptcy system through this period of
instability is a tribute to the ingenuity of the Judicial Conference, the
Administrative Office, the courts, and individual practitioners. On
many occasions, challenges and obstructions could have further
disrupted the system. Instead, entities and individuals got involved,
and are still involved, in working together to keep the bankruptcy
system functioning.
E. Evolution of the Bankruptcy Rules
The Bankruptcy Rules also underwent significant transformations
to conform with changes in the bankruptcy system. Bankruptcy Rules,
designed to govern the procedural implementation of bankruptcy law,
were first adopted in 1973.15 Those rules contained separate sections
for each operating chapter under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
Once Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules began revising the Bankruptcy Rules. As an initial matter, it decided to integrate fully the
rules under all chapters of the Bankruptcy Code and in all civil
proceedings arising under or cases related to title 11.16 This effort
reflected Congress' intent to elevate the newly created bankruptcy
courts and make them functionally independent. The Bankruptcy
Rules became effective on August 1, 1983, and superseded all previous
rules.3 7
Enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act in 1984, of course, required further revision of the 1983 Rules.
The reconstituted Advisory Committee began preparing amendments
to the Bankruptcy Rules to de-emphasize the functional independence
of the bankruptcy courts and reflect the changes in the bankruptcy

33. SeeADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATEJUDGES SYSTEM 43-44 (1995); Memorandum ofJune 28,1984, supra

note 32.
34. See Lundin v. Mecham, 980 F.2d 1450,1454,1460 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that William
E. Foley was original defendant, and L. Ralph Mecham was substituted upon his becoming
Director of the Administrative Office of United States Courts); Memorandum from William E.

Foley, Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Judges, U.S. Courts
ofAppeals,Judges, United States District Courts, and former BankruptcyJudges (July 11, 1984)
(on file with author).
35. See Order of Apr. 24, 1973, 411 U.S. 989, 991-92 (1973) (approving Bankruptcy Rules
and authorizing ChiefJustice to transmit rules to Congress).
386. Letter ofTransmittal of 1983 rules from Advisory Committee (Hon. RuggieroJ.Aldisert,
Chairman) to Judicial Conference and Supreme Court (Aug. 9, 1982).
37. Order of Apr. 25,1983, 97 F.R.D. 57, 57 (S. Ct. 1983) (approving amended Bankruptcy
Rules and authorizing ChiefJustice to transmit rules to Congress).
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system brought about by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984. The amended rules became effective August
1, 1987.38
In late 1986, however, the enactment of the Bankruptcy Judges,
United States Trustee, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 198619
brought about yet another structural change in the bankruptcy
system. The 1986 Act transformed the United States Trustee program
from an experimental pilot program to a virtually nationwide
system," and necessitated extensive further amendments to the
Bankruptcy Rules, which took effect August 1, 1991."
Director Mecham has consistently championed the representation
of bankruptcy judges and former bankruptcy judges on the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules. Whereas the reconstituted Advisory
Committee had only one bankruptcy judge in 1985, by 1987 the
Committee had been further restructured to include two sitting
bankruptcy judges and three former bankruptcy judges. Today, the
chairman of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, appointed
by the ChiefJustice, is a bankruptcy judge.
F

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
On October 22, 1994, the President signed the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994.42 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 establishes the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission, prescribes bankruptcy
appellate panel services consisting of bankruptcy judges as the
ordinary forum for deciding bankruptcy appeals, and allows bankruptcyjudges to conduct jury trials in certain proceedings."
Among other things, the nine-member Bankruptcy Review
Commission will be entrusted with the important responsibility of
maintaining the delicate balance of leverages necessary to achieve
bankruptcy dispute resolutions. Pursuant to the 1994 Act, it will
conduct hearings, evaluate issues and problems relating to the
bankruptcy system, and report its recommendations within two years
from the date of its first meeting."
38.

Order of Mar. 30, 1987, 114 F.R.D. 193, 193 (S. Ct. 1987) (approving amended

Bankruptcy Rules and authorizing ChiefJustice to transmit rules to Congress).
39. Pub. L No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 581 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)).
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 581(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Six districts (three in North Carolina
and three in Alabama), however, opted to retain the bankruptcy administrator system. See id.
§ 581 note.
41. Order of Apr. 30, 1990, 500 U.S. 965, 965 (1991).
42. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 note).
43. See id. §§ 601-610.
44. See id. §§ 603, 608.
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G. Other Improvements in the Bankruptcy System DuringDirector
Mecham's Tenure
Having weathered the constitutional crisis of the early 1980s, the
bankruptcy court system in the latter half of the decade still faced
major challenges. They were: (1) attracting qualified individuals to
the bench who would devote their careers to judicial service, and (2)
affording justice to the parties and expediting the processing of cases
as bankruptcy filings nearly tripled from 1984 to 1992.'
. In 1988, years of effort culminated in the enactment of a special
retirement system for bankruptcy judges and federal magistrate
judges.46 That year also saw the enactment of a statutory salary level
for bankruptcy judges, set at ninety-two percent of the salary of a
federal district judge.47
In 1991, theJudicial Conference approved an empirically developed
case-weight system for evaluating bankruptcy judgeship needs,
bringing greater certainty to the process of evaluating requests for
additional judges made by individual districts.'8 In these times of
budgetary constraint and increased congressional scrutiny of all
government expenditures, the case-weight formula will provide
fairness to the districts and ensure credibility with Congress concerning judgeship requests.
In the bankruptcy clerks' offices, automation was a major factor in
enabling staff to process the surge in filings that began in the mid1980s in the oil-producing states and rippled across the country in the
early 1990s. The bankruptcy court clerks have progressed from
scattered pilot automation projects in 1985 to full electronic docketing capability in every bankruptcy court today.
Each of these achievements is significant. Each contributed to the
building of a respected court system staffed by judges of exceptional

45. In the reporting year endingJune 30,1984, there were 344,275 bankruptcy cases filed.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 414 (1984). In the reporting year
ending June 30, 1992, there were 977,478 cases filed. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIREC'TOR, AcnvTIEs OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 55 (1992). During this same period, the number of bankruptcy
judgeships increased only by about one-third. In large part, the dedication of the bankruptcy
judges and the streamlining of the process permitted the bankruptcy system to handle the
increased caseload.
46. Act of Nov. 15, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-659, 102 Stat. 3910 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 377 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
47. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, tit. IV, § 408, 101 Stat. 1329-1, 1329-27.
48. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 12-13 (1991).
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quality who are supported by efficient, well-managed clerks' offices.
Each owes much to the leadership and commitment of Ralph
Mecham.
II.

LOOKING AHEAD

The peculiar structure and specialized nature of the bankruptcy
system in the United States invites appraisal and experimentation.
For instance, bankruptcy law is inherently associated with commercial
law, and new ideas on court structure may well take advantage of such
characteristics. The stability and innovation brought to the bankruptcy system during Director Mecham's tenure has made it possible to
consider new ideas for the future.
Perhaps one suggestion that is ripe for consideration is the
establishment of a bankruptcy court system with Article III judges in
a bankruptcy appellate division, and non-Article III bankruptcy judges
in the trial court division. Under this structure, the bankruptcy trial
courts would become adjuncts of the bankruptcy appellate court,
deriving their authority by delegation from the bankruptcy appellate
court rather than the district courts.
A bankruptcy appellate court would be established in each circuit
with a bankruptcy caseload to justify it, or a bankruptcy appellate
court could be assigned to several circuits with less bankruptcy activity.
In most cases, a bankruptcy appellate court could be composed of as
few as three judges, with judges from other bankruptcy appellate
courts sitting by designation as the need arises.
The Article IIIjudges of the bankruptcy appellate court would be
vested not only with appellate jurisdiction, but also with jurisdiction
to exercise the same bankruptcy authority that district courts now
exercise. Under such an approach, separate judges of the bankruptcy
appellate court, while principally acting as appellate judges, would
also function as bankruptcy trial judges in cases where non-core
matters must be resolved.49 The concept of a dual trial and appellate role for judges is not new. Currently in the Ninth Circuit, the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, which is a non-Article HI tribunal, is
staffed by sitting bankruptcy judges.
Under the present system, the option of demanding that a district
court hear non-core issues is often used by litigants for purposes of

49. Of course, a bankruptcy appellate judge would not participate on a panel reviewing his
or her own decisions as a bankruptcy trial judge. Rather, if the bankruptcy appellate court
numbered only three, a bankruptcy appellate judge from another circuit could be designated
to sit in the place of the judge being reviewed.
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delay. Under the proposed structure, a bankruptcy appellate judge
with a high level of expertise would be available to hear non-core
matters within a shorter time period. This would arguably invite
waivers of the Article IIIjudge requirement, and allow more of those
issues to be determined by the bankruptcy trial judges.
Furthermore, because bankruptcy law is closely related to commercial law and other areas of law reviewed by circuit courts, the decisions
of an independent bankruptcy appellate court could potentially
conflict with circuit precedent, and introduce uncertainty into the
market system. Therefore, the circuit courts should be permitted to
review bankruptcy appellate court decisions en banc if conflicts arise
between the bankruptcy law and the commercial law of a circuit.
This sort of restructuring of the bankruptcy system would provide
a number of benefits. The establishment of an Article III bankruptcy
appellate court would create a body of uniform bankruptcy law with
precedential value within the circuits. This is in contrast to the
current status of decisions by the bankruptcy appellate panels, which
are not binding on Article III courts, and may hold persuasive value
only for bankruptcy courts.5" Bankruptcy cases would remain in a
specialized court where they can be more efficiently resolved.
The proposed structure would also eliminate the unjustified dualappellate nature of the current system, which allows a bankruptcy
litigant "two bites at the apple" by providing an appeal to the district
court, as well as a second appeal to the circuit court. Under this
proposal, only one as-of-right appeal to the bankruptcy appellate court
would be available, lifting the burden of bankruptcy appeals from
congested district and circuit court dockets.
III.

CONCLUSION

Through the Mecham years, the bankruptcy system, once bereft of
authority and identity, has developed into a stable and progressive
organization. It is able to manage efficiently and bring to conclusion
large numbers of cases and highly complex litigation and reorganizations. The system enters this new and challenging era with a stronger
voice, a stature fortified by dedicated and qualified jurists, and the
potential and maturity to adapt to the changing needs of society.

50. See, e.g., Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that
"district courts must always be free to decline to follow BAP [Bankruptcy Appellate Panel]
decisions and to formulate their own rules within their jurisdiction").

